Introduction
This study provides evidence of negative information transfers from management forecasts to rival firms. Prior literature on information transfers from management forecasts (Baginski, 1987; Han, Wild, and Ramesh, 1989; Pyo and Lustgarten, 1990 ) focuses on positive intra-industry information transfers, where good (bad) news from a forecasting firm causes on-average a positive (negative) stock market reaction from non-forecasting firms in the same industry. We argue that the information transfer from the same management forecast can be positive or negative based on the degree of competitiveness between the forecaster and the information receiver. Positive information transfers are due to industry commonalities whereas negative information transfers are caused by competitive shifts between rival firms. Hence, we hypothesize negative information transfers to rivals, and positive information transfers to non-rival firms in the same industry. A negative information transfer occurs when a good (bad) news announcement made by a firm conveys market share taken away from (given to) the competition, thereby causing a negative (positive) stock market reaction from rival firms.
Although prior studies (Foster, 1981; Baginski, 1987; Pownall and Waymire, 1989; Dietrich, 1989; Schipper, 1990) recognize the potential existence of information transfers from competitive shifts, little research has empirically examined negative information transfers. Two notable exceptions can be found in the finance literature. Lang and Stulz (1992) investigate contagion and competitive intra-industry effects with respect to bankruptcy announcements, and Laux, Starks, and Yoon (1998) examine the relative importance of these two different intraindustry effects in relation to large dividend revisions.
This study is different from previous research (e.g., Lang and Stulz, 1992; Laux, Starks, and Yoon, 1998) in several ways. First, unlike earlier studies that do not separate rival firms from other firms, we classify the information receivers as rival firms and non-rival firms. From this partitioning, we are able to show both positive and negative information transfers from the same set of management forecasts, which would not have been revealed without sample partitioning.
Second, we examine not only negative "intra-industry" information transfers, but also the more general case of negative information transfers to all rival firms that are identified through searching
Hoover's or a forecasting firm's 10-K report. Finally, by documenting negative information transfers from management forecasts to rival firms in the same industry, we attempt to reconcile statistically insignificant (or marginally significant at best) evidence of intra-industry information transfers from directional tests and statistically significant results from non-directional tests documented in earlier literature. 1 Our study attempts to distinguish between positive (due to industry commonalities) and negative (due to the competitive shifts) information transfers associated with management forecasts, and thus shed light on the issue of intra-industry information transfers.
In this study, we define firms that are listed as rivals in Hoover's or in the forecasting firm's 10-K report as rivals of the forecaster. Firms classified as non-rivals of the forecaster are firms that share the same four-digit primary SIC code as the forecaster but are not listed as rivals in Hoover's or the forecaster's 10-K report.
The majority of our results support the existence of negative information transfers to rival firms. The results from industry information transfer analyses show negative (positive) intra-industry information transfers between forecasting firms and non-forecasting firms identified as rivals (non-rivals) with the same four-digit primary SIC code. Furthermore, negative intraindustry information transfers from revenue forecasts are more evident than those from earnings forecasts. We also present evidence on the more general case of negative information transfers.
When we examine information transfers to all rivals identified in Hoover's or 10-K reports, regardless of industry classification, negative information transfers are evident from management revenue forecasts and this result is mainly due to strong negative information transfers from bad news forecasts. Analyses of rival firms that are identified in Hoover's or 10-K reports and share the same two-digit primary SIC codes with forecasting firms generate similar results.
The next section formulates our hypothesis. This is followed by a discussion of the research design. Section 4 discusses the empirical results. The final section concludes.
Hypothesis Development
Since Firth (1976) and Foster (1981) found co-movement between stock returns of firms releasing earnings and stock returns of other firms in the same industry, researchers have turned their attention to intra-industry information transfers from management forecasts due to externalities created by voluntary disclosures. Pownall and Waymire (1989) show that firms issuing management earnings forecasts receive a lower magnitude of earnings information transfer at the time of other industry members' earnings announcements than do firms that do not issue management earnings forecasts. Baginski (1987) shows a positive relation between earnings forecast information and market-adjusted abnormal returns of non-forecasting firms. Han, Wild, and Ramesh (1989) attempt to separate announcement-induced information transfers from general index movements. When returns are adjusted for industry index movements as well as market movements, they find that intra-industry information transfer is very weak at best.
If one group of non-forecasting firms receives positive information transfers and another group of non-forecasting firms receives negative information transfers from the same set of management forecasts, the overall result may be interpreted as indicating no information transfer due to the offsetting effects of the two types of information transfers. In a study closely related to our research, Lang and Lundholm (1996) show that after controlling for a firm's own earnings, the relation between its stock returns and industry counterpart firms' earnings is negative. They interpret the result as meaning that other firms' earnings announcements provide primarily a competitive component of information. The empirical setting of Lang and Lundholm (1996) is different from the event study design used in other information transfer studies. Lang and Lundholm (1996) focus on whether earnings of other firms in the same industry have incremental information content once a firm discloses its own earnings. In this setting, though other firms' earnings announcements transfer industry information in general, they may not be reflected in a firm's own returns because the firm's own earnings are already disclosed. Also, it is difficult to reconcile their findings of overall competitive information provided by other firms' earnings with the overall positive information transfers appearing in intra-industry information transfer studies.
Determining whether positive or negative information transfer dominates likely depends on the competitive relationship between the forecasting firm and the firm that is the recipient of the forecast information. If a firm forecasts good (bad) news, this may convey good (bad) prospects for its industry, thereby leading to a positive information transfer. However, it could also mean market share taken away from (given to) rivals, leading to a negative information transfer. Thus, if a firm makes a forecast, a positive information transfer caused by industry commonalities is likely to prevail with respect to industry counterpart firms that are not the forecasting firm's rivals. In contrast, a negative information transfer due to a competitive shift may prevail for firms that are the forecasting firm's rivals. Therefore, we propose and test the following hypothesis, stated in the alternative form:
The information transfer from a firm's management forecast to rival (non-rival) firms is negative (positive). In addition, we partition the sample by forecast news based on abnormal stock returns of forecasting firms around the time of the forecast; with positive abnormal returns implying good news and negative abnormal returns implying bad news. Since management earnings and revenue forecast surprises are often of different signs, 7 the abnormal return is a better surrogate for the news of the forecasts in this study than are earnings or revenue surprises.
Research Design

FORECASTER SAMPLE SELECTION
SINGLE-INDEX AND TWO-INDEX PRICING MODELS
In determining abnormal returns, following Han, Wild, and Ramesh (1989) , we employ both single-index and two-index pricing models as follows:
5 We identified rivals for 154 management forecasts through the search of Hoover's or the 10-K. For the remaining 102 management forecasts, no rival is identified and all non-forecasting firms in the same four-digit SIC code industry are defined as non-rivals. 6 Of 1,926 rival observations, 501 (893) rivals share the same four-(two-) digit SIC code with the forecasting firms.
Since there are 4,540 non-rival observations, the total number of non-forecasting observations used in the analyses is 5,041 (5,433) for four-(two-) digit SIC matching and 6,466 without industry matching. Of 744 rival observations matched with firms issuing both earnings and revenue forecasts, 186 (338) rivals share the same four-(two-) digit SIC code with the forecasting firms. Since there are 1,546 non-forecasting, non-rival observations, the total number of non-forecasting observations used in the analyses is 1,732 (1,884) for four-(two-) digit SIC matching and 2,290 without industry matching. 7 A total of 27 out of 104 joint management forecasts of earnings and revenue have earnings and revenue forecast surprises of different signs.
where R i,t is the daily stock return for firm i on day t, R M,t is the return on a value-weighted market portfolio for day t, and R I,t is the return on an equally-weighted four-digit SIC code industry portfolio (not including firm i) for day t. Day t = 0 is the day of the management forecast and the parameters in equations (1) and (2) are estimated using ordinary least squares regressions with stock returns from days -220 to -21 relative to the date of the management forecast. Equation (1) is the abnormal return from the standard market model. Equation (2) is the abnormal return after controlling for both market and industry returns. Han, Wild, and Ramesh (1989) show that controlling for the industry cross-sectional covariation in returns is important in tests of intra-industry information transfer from management earnings forecasts. 
UNEXPECTED FORECASTS AND CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS
We measure earnings and revenue forecast surprises using the unexpected management forecast for firm i:
where (3) and (4), the management point estimate of earnings (revenue) is used to proxy for MEF (MRF) when management issues a point forecast. When management issues a range forecast, the midpoint of the range is used and when management issues a minimum (maximum) forecast, the lower (upper) bound is used. In addition, to make it comparable to the 
where the event period is day -2 to day +1 relative to the forecast day and ξ is either u or e from model (1) or (2). Also, for the remainder of this paper, CAR based on the single-index model will be denoted by MCAR and CAR based on the two-index model will be denoted by IMCAR. forecasts are on average bad news. This is supported by a full sample median value for UMEF of -2.81% and a full sample median value for UMRF of -0.37%. Another interesting finding is that the median UMEF value is -5.74% when earnings forecasts are issued alone but -2.50% when earnings and revenue forecasts are issued together. This implies the possibility that when the management earnings forecast surprise is better, management is more likely to include supporting information in the form of a revenue forecast to enhance the believability of the management earnings forecast (Dye, 1986; Jennings, 1987; Hutton, Miller, and Skinner, 2003) .
Empirical Results
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Also, as expected, average UMEF and UMRF are higher for firms with positive CAR (good news) than for firms with negative CAR (bad news). Panel B of [Insert Table 2 about here]
INFORMATION TRANSFERS FROM EARNINGS FORECASTS
To gain initial insights on the intra-industry information transfers from management forecasts, we first consider only management earnings forecasts and run the following regression using the full sample of non-forecasting firms in the same four-digit SIC code industry:
where
is CAR for non-forecasting firms when CAR is computed for days {-2, +1} using the single-index (two-index) pricing model and UMEF is the unexpected management earnings forecast. Regression model (6) serves as the baseline model. To capture the effect of the information transfer from a forecasting firm to its rival firms and non-rival firms separately, we run the following regression with rival dummies:
where RIVAL D is an indicator variable that takes on a value of one if the non-forecaster is a competitor identified through Hoover's and 10-Ks, and zero otherwise.
We run three versions of regression equation (7). To examine the intra-industry information transfers to rival firms and non-rival firms separately, we estimate the regression models with only non-forecasting firms that share the same four-digit primary SIC codes. Next, to provide more general evidence of negative information transfers to rival firms, we run two versions of the regression with more observations. Specifically, we run the regression including rival firms that share the same two-digit primary SIC codes with the forecasters to see if negative information transfers can be extended to rival firms outside of the four-digit SIC industry. We also run the regression including all rival firms identified through Hoover's and 10-Ks regardless of industry membership.
The results are reported in Table 3 . In Panel A, the results from regression equation (6) using the single-index and the two-index models confirm the findings of Han, Wild, and Ramesh (1989) . The coefficient on UMEF from the single index model is positive and significant at the five percent level (t-value = 2.19), while the coefficient from the two-index model is statistically insignificant. Thus, when returns are adjusted for industry index movements as well as market movements, positive intra-industry information transfer disappears. We argue that positive and negative intra-industry information transfers may offset each other and lead to an overall finding of no information transfer. The results from regression equation (7) provide evidence that is consistent with our conjecture.
In Panel B of Table 3 , the first regression is estimated with only non-forecasting firms that share the same four-digit primary SIC code with forecasters. The coefficient 2 α is for nonrival firms and the coefficient on the interaction, 3
α , captures the difference in information transfer to rival and non-rival firms. Therefore, 10 We employ the two-index model to control for general industry index movements. Abnormal returns from the two-index model separate announcement-induced information transfers from not only market-wide shocks, but also common industry shocks. Negative intra-industry information transfer should be more pronounced in the two-index model because industry-wide shocks may neutralize the effect of negative information transfer when the singleindex model is used. The evidence reported in Tables 3 to 5 is generally consistent with this prediction. For this reason, when the results from the single-index and two-index models do not agree, we should emphasize the results from the two-index model. Some of the forecasters' rivals identified from Hoover's and 10-K reports do not share the same four-digit primary SIC codes with forecasters. Although examining rival firms in the same four-digit SIC industry provides insights on intra-industry information transfers and enables us to reconcile our results with those in the prior literature, investigation of information transfers to rivals regardless of whether they are in the same four-digit SIC industry could provide more general evidence of negative information transfers to rival firms. Therefore, we run regression equation (7) with additional rivals outside of the forecaster's four-digit SIC industry.
However, for samples that include rivals that do not share the same four-digit industry membership with the forecaster, we do not apply the two-index pricing model because it is not sensible to control for industry returns in those samples. When rivals do not share the same fourdigit SIC industry code, the control for the forecaster's industry cross-sectional covariation through the two-index model does not remove the industry-wide shock for these rivals. Panel B of Table 3 reports the results. We estimate the second regression including rivals that share the same two-digit SIC code and the third regression with all rivals regardless of industry membership. The results are qualitatively similar to those that utilize rivals with the same fourdigit SIC code. In both regressions, the coefficient on UMEF for non-rival firms, 2 α , is positive and statistically significant. However, the coefficient for rival firms, 3 2 α α + , is negative but insignificant when rival firms share the same two-digit or four-digit SIC code. The coefficient 3 α is negative and marginally significant in the second regression.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
INFORMATION TRANSFERS FROM EARNINGS AND REVENUE FORECASTS
If negative information transfers mean competitive shifts between rival firms, information about revenue as well as earnings would be valuable to investors of rival firms.
Therefore, to delve into this, we focus on the sample of management forecasts with both earnings and revenue and attempt to separate out positive and negative information transfers.
We first confirm the results reported in Table 3 using the forecasting firms that issue both earnings and revenue forecasts and matched non-forecasting firms. Table 4 reports the results.
Overall, the results are quite similar to those reported in Table 3 . As shown in Table 4 , Panel A, the baseline regression results using the single-index and two-index models show that the explanatory powers of the regression models are greater for firms issuing both earnings and revenue forecasts together than those reported in Panel A of Table 3 . In the two-index model, the coefficient on UMEF is marginally significant for forecasting firms issuing both earnings and revenues together, which is different from insignificant coefficients reported in Panel A of Table   3 and in Han, Wild, and Ramesh (1989) . In panels B and C, information transfers to non-rival firms ( 2 α ) are positive and significant in all regressions. Information transfers to rival firms ( 3 2 α α + ) are mostly negative although they are only marginally significant for rivals with the same four-digit SIC code as the forecaster. The coefficient that shows the difference between rival and non-rival firms ( 3 α ) is negative and significant at conventional levels. The latter result is more evident than that reported in Table 3. [Insert Table 4 about here]
Next, using the sample of non-forecasting firms in the same four-digit SIC code industry as firms that issue both earnings and revenue forecasts, we estimate the following base model with both unexpected management earnings and revenue forecasts:
where UMRF is the unexpected management revenue forecast.
To capture the effects of information transfers to rival firms and non-rival firms separately, we also run the following regression:
where RIVAL D is an indicator variable that takes on a value of one if the non-forecaster is a rival firm, and zero otherwise. We further refine the sample based on the types of forecast news: good and bad news forecasts. Table 5 presents the results. In Panel A, we report the results from baseline equation (8) and find no evidence of intra-industry information transfers from UMEF or UMRF using both the single-index and two-index models. This could be due to the offsetting effects of positive information transfers to one group of non-forecasting firms and negative information transfers to another group of non-forecasting firms.
Thus, to further investigate this issue, we run three versions of regression equation (9): (1) the first model including non-rival firms and rival firms identified through Hoover's and 10-Ks that share the same four-digit primary SIC codes; (2) the second model including non-rival firms and rival firms that share the same two-digit primary SIC codes with the forecasters; and (3) the third model including non-rival firms and all rival firms identified through Hoover's and 10-Ks regardless of industry membership. Again, we estimate the first model to investigate different intra-industry information transfers, and the second and third models to find more general evidence of negative information transfer to rival firms. Table 5 reports the results from the single-index model with non-forecasting firms that share the same four-digit primary SIC code with forecasters. In the first regression using the full sample, the coefficient on UMEF, 2 α , is positive and significant and the coefficient on UMRF, 4 α , is positive but insignificant. In contrast, for rival firms, the sum of the coefficients on UMEF, 3 2 α α + , is positive but insignificant while the sum of the coefficients on UMRF, 5 4 α α + , is negative and significant (t-value = -1.97). These results suggest a positive information transfer from earnings forecasts to non-rival firms and a negative information transfer from revenue forecasts to rival firms. It is also interesting to note that negative information transfers from earnings forecasts that are reported in Table 4 (i.e., results before controlling for revenue forecast information) disappear when revenue forecast information is included in the regressions.
Panel B of
We further refine the analyses by partitioning the sample based on the types of management forecast news. As shown in the second regression in Panel B, for cases in which the news in the revenue and earnings forecasts are on average good (i.e., positive forecasting firm's CAR), the coefficient on UMEF is positive and significant for non-rival firms, but the coefficient on UMRF is insignificant. For rival firms, the sum of the coefficients on both UMEF, α α + , is negative and significant (t-value = -2.01). These results indicate that for cases in which the news in the revenue and earnings forecasts are on average bad, negative intra-industry information transfer to rival firms is delivered through revenue information. Table 5 show the results of regression equation (9) Finally, we run regression equation (9) using the two-index pricing model with rival and non-rival firms that share the same four-digit primary SIC code. Panel E of Table 5 reports the results. The results are similar to those presented in Panel B. However, the negative information transfer from revenue forecasts to rival firms is marginally significant for both good and bad news forecasts.
Panels C and D of
In sum, we find positive intra-industry information transfers, which indicate industry commonalities, to non-rivals in the same industry. However, when the non-forecasters are rivals, we find a combination of positive and negative intra-industry information transfers from management forecasts; more prevalent negative information transfers from revenue forecasts and weaker positive information transfers conveyed by earnings forecasts. Such negative information transfer from "revenue" forecasts rather than from "earnings" forecasts is in line with the common belief that market share change is more likely to be reflected in revenue forecasts than in earnings forecasts. On the other hand, we find that a positive (negative) information transfer from earnings (revenue) forecasts is more evident in the rival firm sample when a forecasting firm issues bad news. We interpret these results to mean that when a firm releases both earnings and revenue forecasts, and the news are on average bad, earnings forecasts are associated with industry commonalities and revenue forecasts are associated with a competitive shift in the information transfer to rival firms.
11
[Insert Table 5 "The company, for instance, says it is continuing to pay for a serious stumble in notebook computers that has kept Dell out of the fastest-growing segment of the computer business. Chairman Michael S. Dell said his company doesn't expect to have a competitive notebook computer on the market until the end of the year." (Wall Street Journal, July 15, 1993)
The aforementioned statement implies that Dell's poor management forecast is at least in part due to its poor competitive position, which may mean good news to its rivals.
An indicator variable is created and set to one if a management forecast announcement includes any information that helps investors form expectations about changes in competitive position in the industry and zero otherwise. This additional information dummy variable is 11 We also conduct a test with firms that release earnings forecasts only and find that when the earnings forecast is bad news, information transfer to rival firms is negative and statistically insignificant in the single index model but negative and marginally significant in the two index model. This evidence is generally consistent with the results reported in Table 3. interacted with both UMEF*D RIVAL and UMRF*D RIVAL in regression equation (9). We expect that negative information transfers to rival firms are stronger when additional information about industry competition is provided with the management forecasts. The untabulated results are consistent with this conjecture and are qualitatively similar regardless of the choice of pricing model.
Conclusions
In this paper, we examine the two different types of information transfers: positive information transfers stemming from industry commonalities and negative information transfers due to competitive shifts. Also, we study information transfers from management revenue forecasts as well as management earnings forecasts. Though prior literature (e.g., Foster, 1981; Baginski, 1987; Pownall and Waymire, 1989; Dietrich, 1989; Schipper, 1990 ) recognizes potential negative information transfers from competitive shifts, little research has focused on negative information transfers or separately investigated positive and negative information transfers. In this study, we attempt to distinguish between positive (due to industry commonalities) and negative (due to the competitive shifts) information transfers associated with management forecasts. Using the forecasting firm's rivals identified by Hoover's and 10-K reports, we document negative (positive) information transfers to rival (non-rival) firms. The results of this study help one understand how information transfers operate.
Through the analysis of intra-industry information transfers, we show positive intraindustry information transfers to non-rival firms and negative intra-industry information transfers to rivals. We also present evidence that is consistent with positive and negative intra-industry information transfers offsetting each other, and thereby leading to an overall finding of no information transfers even though they exist.
Our evidence from earnings forecasts shows that the effects of negative intra-industry information transfers from earnings forecasts are more pronounced when industry returns are controlled using the two-index model. Further, negative information transfers to rival firms are more evident when forecasting firms predict revenues and earnings together than when they predict earnings alone.
Examination of both revenue forecasts and earnings forecasts and partitioning management forecasts based on good and bad news forecasts reveal additional insights on information transfers. When firms forecast both earnings and revenues, and the overall information is viewed as good news for the forecasting firms, we find that negative intra-industry information transfers are marginal. In contrast, when firms forecast bad news, we find a combination of positive and negative intra-industry information transfers to rival firms with the same four-digit primary SIC code; positive information transfers (industry commonalities) appearing in earnings forecasts and negative transfers (competitive shifts) carried by revenue forecasts.
Through an analysis using all rivals identified by Hoover's and 10-K reports, regardless of their industry membership, we present more general evidence of negative information transfers to rival firms. We also provide evidence that negative information transfers are conveyed by revenue forecasts in the case of bad news forecasts, which is consistent with the results for rival firms in the intra-industry analysis.
According to the principles of modern portfolio theory, optimal investment decisions take into account the effect of buying or selling a firm on portfolio risk, and individual firms matter insofar as their characteristics combine to determine portfolio characteristics. Therefore, it is important for investors to estimate and evaluate the covariance of returns in a portfolio. By documenting different directions of return interdependencies among different firms, created from management forecasts, this study sheds light on this issue. Externalities created by this voluntary disclosure should also be of interest to policymakers.
Our results should be interpreted with caution because of the low adjusted R 2 . As seen from our results, information transfers account for less than two percent of the three-day abnormal returns of non-forecasters. Although the effects uncovered in our study are statistically significant and interesting, their economic importance might be relatively small. Therefore, investors may not be able to earn large profits by exploiting a rival's forecast information.
Future research could examine negative information transfers for required disclosures such as earnings and sales announcements. In addition, since management and analyst cash flow forecasts have become more prevalent, it would be interesting to investigate the information transfers from such forecasts. Rivals are defined to be all non-forecasting firms that are listed as rivals of the forecasting firm in either Hoover's or the forecasting firm's 10-K report. Non-rivals of the forecaster are those that share the same four-digit SIC code as the forecaster but are not listed as rivals in Hoover's or the 10-K report. , where MEF is the management earnings forecast and AEF is the analyst earnings forecast. D RIVAL = an indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 if the non-forecasting firm is defined as a rival identified through Hoover's or the forecasting firm's 10-K, 0 otherwise. In Panel C, we do not apply the two-index pricing model for the analyses using rivals outside of the forecasters' four-digit SIC industries because it is not sensible to control for industry returns in those samples. , where MEF is the management earnings forecast and AEF is the analyst earnings forecast. D RIVAL = an indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 if the non-forecasting firm is defined as a rival identified through Hoover's or the forecasting firm's 10-K, 0 otherwise. In Panel C, we do not apply the two-index pricing model for the analyses using rivals outside of the forecasters' four-digit SIC industries because it is not sensible to control for industry returns in those samples. 
